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Abstract 
Various field studies and experimental simulations demonstrated that causal 
reasoning increases after unexpected as well as after unpleasant events. However, 
unpleasant events are seen as less likely than pleasant ones in everyday life. 
Accordingly, the subjective probability of the event and its hedonic quality were 
naturally confounded in these studies. To isolate the contribution of both 
determinants, the subjective probability and the valence of an event were 
independently manipulated in a laboratory experiment. Subjects completed an 
ostensible ‘professional skills test’ and received either success or failure feedback in 
relation to a criterion set by the experimenter. The subjective probability of success 
was varied by informing subjects about the distribution of success and failure in a 
comparable population (either 23 per cent or 77 per cent were said to meet the 
criterion). The results indicate a pronounced valence effect: The iniensity of causal 
reasoning and the number of possible reasons reported for the outcome was greater 
after negative than after positive feedback, independent of the a priori probability of 
the outcome. No evidence for an increase in causal explanations after unexpected, as 
compared to expected, events was obtained. Several mediating processes are 
discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most attribution theories share the basic assumption that individuals are motivated to 
attribute underlying reasons to perceived events (e.g. Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973). This 
assumption is reflected in attribution research, which seems to imply that the 
attribution of causality is the predominant form of cognitive activity. The validity of 
this assumption, however, is disputed. Manis (1977), for example, questions the claim 
that persons are preoccupied with the search for causal explanations most of their 
time. If they are not, the conditions under which causal thinking occurs in everyday 
life need to be circumscribed in more detail. 
In previous research, the determinants of causal reasoning have been investigated 
with various non-responsive methods, including the content analysis of written 
material or of subjects’ free verbalizations in experimental simulations. In other 
studies, researchers tried to draw conclusions about the occurrence of causal reasoning 
from the observation of related cognitive processes, such as information search and 
memory (for a review see Weiner, 1985). The results of these studies consistently 
indicate that the extent of causal reasoning is determined by two factors (in addition to 
the less interesting case of explicit ‘why’-questions), namely the expectedness of the 
event and its affective valence (Hastie, 1984; Weiner, 1985). Causal reasoning is more 
likely to be elicited by negative rather than positive, and by unexpected rather than 
expected events. Additive effects of both factors (where the highest degree of causal 
thinking is obtained after negative and unexpected events, and the lowest degree of 
causal reasoning after positive and expected events) as well as occasional interaction 
effects have been observed. Abele (1986), for example, found in an experimental 
simulation that negative valence increased the extent of causal reasoning especially for 
events of high probability, but less so for events of low probability. 
Several processes may contribute to these findings. In the framework of schema 
theory (cf: Taylor and Crocker, 1981; Schwarz, 1985 for reviews), one might argue that 
events are understood to the extent that they are consistent with higher-order 
knowledge-structures (schemata). In such cases, a search for causal explanations 
seems to be unnecessary. Rather, a person should only engage in causal thinking if an 
event that he or she experiences is inconsistent with the available schemata. In this 
framework, unexpectedness of an event can be conceptualized as a special case of 
schema-inconsistency. 
Similarly, Weiner (1985) assumes that unexpected events trigger some kind of 
cognitive orienting response. The deviation from a norm (e.g. an expectancy) needs to 
be explained, whereas events that are consistent with an expectancy have been 
frequently analysed in the past for their possible causes, so that the expense of 
attributional activities can be avoided. 
In addition, negative events and their accompanying negative affective states may 
instigate causal reasoning because individuals are motivated to avoid unpleasant states 
(Weiner, 1985; Schwarz, 1987). To do  so, they need adequate knowledge about the 
potential causes of negative events. Moreover, searching explanations for negative 
events may serve the purpose of reducing the aversive affect by finding external and 
self-irrelevant causes for the initially unpleasant event (Wyer and Carlston, 1979). 
Similarly, action identification theory (Wegner and Vallacher, 1986) predicts that 
persons who experience negative affect during or after completion of an action may 
consider the action in more detail at a lower level of abstraction (Vallacher and 
Wegner, 1987) and may think about possible reasons for the action’s outcome. 
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In addition, the process of causal reasoning itself may reduce the intensity of an 
emotion (Schwarz, 1987). Explaining why an event occurred promotes a dissociation 
of affect that has been experimentally demonstrated (e.g. Speisman, Lazarus, 
Mordkoff and Davison, 1964; Leyens, Cisneros and Hossay, 1976; Strack, Schwarz 
and Gschneidinger, 1985) as well as applied in various therapeutic approaches (Frank, 
1982). 
It must be taken into account, however, that an event’s affective valence and 
subjective probability are usually confounded; that is, unpleasant events are less likely 
than pleasant events. Let us consider, for example, the outcome of an examination: 
Failing an exam is more unpleasant, but also occurs less often than passing an exam. 
This natural confounding of the two factors ‘subjective probability’ and ‘affective 
valence’ renders it difficult to isolate their relative impact on causal reasoning. Indirect 
evidence for the natural confounding of expectedness and valence is provided by a 
meta-analysis of mood studies that revealed that most respondents report being in a 
happy mood most of the time (Bless and Schwarz, 1984). This result suggests that 
events which elicit positive moods may appear to be the rule, whereas events which 
elicit negative feelings represent exceptions from the rule (Sommers, 1984; Schwarz 
and Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 1987). 
This leads to an ambiguity in the interpretation of research findings that suggest 
mood-dependent increases or decreases of causal and analytic thinking (e.g. Isen, 
Means, Patrick and Nowicki, 1982; Abele, 1986): Do persons in a negative mood think 
more analytically, only because the event that made them feel sad was unexpected to 
them? Can bad moods and negative events, therefore, be conceptualized as 
subcategories of unexpected events, as Hastie (1984) proposed? Or is there a genuine 
impact of moods on causal thinking, independent of their expectedness? 
This issue cannot be settled on the basis of the available empirical evidence, because 
in field studies, the natural confounding of the two variables has to be put up with, and 
in experimental simulations or role-plays, the mood-relevant events are produced by 
the subjects themselves. In order to disentangle the effects of the affective valence and 
subjective probability of an event on subsequent attributions, the two variables were 
independently manipulated in a 2 x 2-factorial laboratory experiment. Subjects were 
exposed to  an event that was either pleasant or unpleasant, and either expected or 
unexpected. Affective valence was operationalized as success versus failure in an 
ability test, and high versus low expectancies were induced by presenting corres- 
ponding distributions of success and failure in a comparable population before the test 
was administered. The central dependent variable was the extent of causal reasoning 
after receiving the test result. 
If subjective probability is the central determinant of causal attribution, unexpected 
events should always elicit explanations, and causal reasoning should increase after 
unexpected success as well as after unexpected failure. If, on the other hand, there is a 
genuine influence of an event’s affective valence on causal attribution, failure should 
elicit more causal reasoning than success, over and above the effects of expectedness. 
METHOD 
Subjects and procedure 
Forty-three students of the University of Mannheim were recruited as paid subjects for 
a study on the improvement of professional skills tests. The experiment was conducted 
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in single sessions. Subjects were told that they would be administered 10 items of a 
professional skills test, and that after working on this task they were to answer various 
questions about the testing situation. The personal relevance of the task was enhanced 
by telling subjects that the test from which the items were taken was a valid predictor 
of professional success. The alleged ‘professional skills test’ items were taken from the 
‘Standard’ and ‘Advanced Progressive Matrices’ (Raven, 1958, 1962)’. 
Independent variables and manipulation check 
To assure that the task was well understood, the experimenter provided detailed 
explanations of two examples. Subsequently, subjects were informed that they could 
win a chocolate bar if they performed successfully. Success was defined as having 
solved at least seven of the 10 items. On a table in one corner of the laboratory, the 
subjects could see several chocolate bars, which had proved to be effective incentives 
in previous studies (Munkel, Strack and Schwarz, 1987). This additional reward was 
introduced to provide a salient mark of success, which would facilitate an expectancy- 
independent subjective definition of success. 
To manipulate the expectancy of success, subjects were either informed that 77 per 
cent (high expectancy conditions) or 23 per cent (low expectancy conditions) of the 
previous student subjects had reached the criterion. Before subjects were administered 
the test items, the effectiveness of the expectancy manipulation was checked. The 
question read: ‘Do you think that you will succeed in solving seven or more of the 10 
items correctly?’ The answer had to be given on a scale ranging from 1 (‘no, certainly 
not’) to I 1  (‘yes, quite certainly’). 
After completion of this manipulation check, the experimenter presented the 10 test 
items and made sure that subjects kept the time limit of 60 seconds per item. Subjects 
were forced to choose a response alternative within this time limit and were told that 
one may ‘often guess the correct answer without being able to fully explain the 
solution principle. So please do make a choice on each item even if you are not certain 
about the correct solution’. This instruction was necessary to ascertain the credibility 
of the feedback. 
When subjects had made their choices for all 10 items, the experimenter took the 
response sheet and went to a different table, ostensibly to check the test result. Up to 
this point, the experimenter was blind with respect to the success versus failure 
condition. Whether the subject would receive positive or negative feedback was 
determined by a card that the experimenter took from a pile invisible to the subjects. 
In the success condition, the subject was told that he or she had eight items correct, 
and the experimenter let him or her choose one of the chocolate bars. In the failure 
condition, the subject was informed that he or she had only four items correct and 
therefore had unfortunately failed to win a chocolate bar. The difficulty of the items 
and the time limit had been chosen so that the success as well as the failure feedback 
were highly credible. An informal interview at the end of the experiment revealed that 
only one subject was suspicious about the validity of the feedback. The data of this 
subject were excluded from the analysis. 
’ hem numbers (in the order of administration) in the failure conditions were: Advanced Progressive 
Matrices (APM) Set II: 24,21, 17; Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) Set E: 12; APM Set 11: 28, 13, 16, 
23,26, 19. In the success conditions: APM Set II:  13, 14,24; SPM Set E: 9; APM Set [I: 17,23,26,20, 16, 
15. 
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Before the dependent variables were assessed, the influence of the success versus 
failure feedback on subjects’ affective state was assessed with the question: ‘How do 
you feel at this very moment?’ The response scale ranged from I (‘very bad’) to 1 I 
(‘very good’). 
Dependent variables 
Subsequently, subjects were asked to  answer a series of questions that were ostensibly 
designed to assess how he or she experienced the testing situation. All questions 
pertained to the extent and intensiiy of causal reasoning. The first two questions were 
phrased in an open-answer format. The first question pertained to the testing situation 
in general, the second one specifically to the test result. Finally, the intensity of causal 
reasoning was directly assessed in a closed response format. Thus, care was taken to 
present first open ended, non-responsive questions and to successively narrow the 
focus on the test result and finally on causal reasoning. 
Thought listings 
Subjects were first instructed to think about the testing situation and to write down 
everything that came to mind. They were provided a legal sized sheet with 18 lines for 
this task. There was no time limit. After this thought listing, subjects were instructed to 
think about their test result and to write down whatever came to mind about this 
aspect. In all other respects, the procedure was identical to the first thought listing. 
Thus, the focus was narrowed on result-related cognitions, but causal thinking was not 
yet explicitly mentioned. 
After completion of the thought listings, subjects were instructed to read though 
each listing and to specify how many causal explanations of the test result it contained. 
Content analysis 
The interpretation of subjects’ own counting of causal explanations is somewhat 
problematic, because subjects might not have produced any ‘spontaneous’ causal 
explanations but might rather have generated reasons after being questioned to check 
their thought listings, which may have caused them to re-interpret the listings in terms 
of causal explanations. Therefore, both thought listings were also content-analysed by 
two independent judges for the total number of words and sentences they contained, 
the number of causal explanations and the number of sentences mentioning positive or 
negative feelings’. The mean inter-rater correspondence for the number of causal 
explanations and the number of feelings mentioned was r 0.65 and r = 0.73, 
respectively. For those cases about which the judges disagreed, the arithmetic mean of 
their ratings was computed for further analyses. A comparison of the total numbers of 
sentences and words that the judges had counted revealed perfect inter-judge 
correspondence. 
* 
*The following instruction was given to the judges: ‘1. Count the number of sentences and the number of 
words on each thought listing. 2. Read the listing carefully and check the number of causal explanations for 
the test result it contains. 3. Read the listing carefully and check the number of statements that express 
positive feelings (like joy, pleasure, relief, happiness, positive surprise etc.). 4. Read the listing carefully and 
check the number of statements that express negative feelings (like sadness, anger, depression, unhappiness, 
negative surprise etc.)’. Both judges analysed the whole corpus of response sheets. 
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Intensity judgments 
Finally, subjects were directly asked to rate the intensity of causal reasoning: ‘How 
intensely did you think about the reasons for your test result?’ The answers were to be 
reported on a scale ranging from 1 (‘not intensely at all’) to 11 (‘very intensely’). 
RESULTS 
Manipulation checks 
As expected, the presentation of population norms affected the subjective probability 
to reach the criterion set by the experimenter. Subjects in the ‘high expectancy’(77 per 
cent success) condition reported a higher expectancy of success ( M =  7.3) than subjects 
in the ‘low expectancy’(23 per cent success) condition ( M =  5.9), (40) = 1 . 9 1 , ~  <0.04, 
one-tailed. To test the effectiveness of the manipulation of success and failure, the 
answers to the question, ‘How do you feel at this very moment?’, were subjected to a 2 
(success versus failure) x 2 (high versus low expectancy) factorial analysis of variance. 
This analysis revealed only a main effect of the ‘success/failure’ manipulation: As 
expected, subjects in the success conditions felt significantly better ( M  = 8.5) than 
subjects in the failure conditions ( M =  7. l ) ,  F(1,38) = 8 . 1 5 , ~  <0.01. The expectedness 
of the result did not affect subjects’ affective state, F<1 for both the expectancy main 
effect and the two-way interaction. 
SRLF--HATED 
TESTING SITUATION TRST URSULT 
S 
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x 
40 5 I- c 
--t F t ::I, 1- f \ =  
S 
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Figure 1. Mean percentages of causal attributions in subjects’ cognitions about the testing situation (left) 
and the test result (right) as a function of valence and subjective probability: Subjects’ self-ratings (above); 
results of content analysis (below). S success, F failure 
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Thus, the manipulation checks revealed that the realization of different levels of 
subjective probability and affective valence was successful. It might be argued, 
however, that subjects in the failure conditions still scored above the scale midpoint on 
the question of affective state and thus felt reasonably well. On the other hand, there is 
evidence that even depressive subjects do not score far below the scale midpoint on 
questions of present mood (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz and Strack, 1988), which implies 
that there may be a general tendency to present oneself favourably on questions of this 
kind. Even if one is in doubt whether the failure condition induced categorically 
negative mood, there is a significant mood difference between success and failure 
conditions, so that subsequent results can be interpreted on the basis of a relative 
mood difference. 
Thought listings 
The percentages of causal explanations in relation to the total number of statements in 
the thought listings about the testing situation and the test result are shown in the 
upper part of Figure 1. 
The 2 (success versus failure) x 2 (high versus low expectancy) factorial analyses of 
variance revealed that subjects’ reported thoughts about the testing situation as well as 
about the test result contained more causal explanations when the subjects had 
experienced a negative event (failure; Ms 35 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively) 
than when they had experienced a positive event (success: Ms = 12 per cent and 5 per 
cent, respectively). The corresponding main effects of ‘affective valence’ are 
statistically significant for both thought listings, Fs (1,38) = 7.38 and 6 . 5 6 , ~ ’ ~  < 0.02. 
In addition to this main effect, an unexpected statistical trend emerged in the first 
thought listing, pertaining to the testing situation in general: Subjects tended to 
generate more causal explanations after an expected (M = 32 per cent) than after an 
unexpected event ( M  = 16 per cent), 4 1 ,  38) = 3.11, p < 0.09. This surprising result 
may be due to the fact that, in the high expectancy conditions, the experimenter had 
already presented an ‘explanation’ by telling subjects the population norms. This 
explanation may have been easily accessible in these conditions and may have 
increased the number of causal explanations. 
Content analysis 
The results of the ratings of two independent judges, again subjected to 2 (success 
versus failure) x 2 (high versus low expectancy) factorial analyses of variance, parallel 
the subjects’ own ratings. The percentages of causal explanations are displayed in the 
lower part of Figure 1. In the judges’ as well as the subjects’ judgment, the negative 
event elicited more causal explanations ( M  = 30 per cent for thoughts on the testing 
situation, and M = 18 per cent for thoughts on the test result) than the positive event 
( M  = 14 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively), 41 ,37 )  5.003, p < 0.04, and F( 1,38) 
5.88, p < 0.03. No main effect for expectedness and no two-way interaction was 
obtained, all p’s > 0.25. 
In the first thought listing, pertaining to the testing situation, the percentages of 
references to positive or negative feelings were unaffected by experimental conditions, 
’One thought listing about the testing situation was unreadable, so there were only 41 valid cases for this 
part of the analysis. 
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allp’s > 0.15. In the second thought listing, pertaining to the test result, main effects of 
affective valence were obtained. After success, subjects’ thought listings contained 
more references to positive (M = 0.66) and fewer references to negative (M = 0.1 1) 
feelings than after failure (M = 0.05 and M 0.40, respectively), F ( 1 ,  38) = 20.58, 
p < 0.0005, and F(I, 38) = 4.72, p < 0.04. No other main or interaction effects 
emerged, allp’s > 0.15. These results provide further evidence for a change of affective 
state in reaction to success and failure. 
Finally, the number of sentences and words in both thought listings were unaffected 
by experimental conditions, all p’s > 0.10. 
- YF 
s 
Figure 2. Subjects’ mean ratings of intensity of causal reasoning as a function of valence and subjective 
probability (eleven-point scale ranging from 1, ‘not intensely at all’, to 1 1, ‘very intensely’). S = success, F = 
failure 
Intensity of causal reasoning 
Subjects’ self-ratings of the intensity of their causal reasoning are consistent with the 
results reported so far. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, subjects in the failure conditions reported a greater 
intensity of causal reasoning (M = 7.3) than subjects in the success conditions (M= 5.4, 
F( 1, 38) = 4.39, p < 0.05. Again, no significant effect of subjective probability of the 
outcome emerged, all other F<1. 
DISCUSSION 
The reported results provide first experimental evidence for the hypothesis that the 
affective valence of an event and the resulting mood state can influence causal 
thinking, independently of the event’s expectedness. Negative events lead to intensified 
causal reasoning in comparison to positive events of equal probability. The results of 
the manipulation checks clearly demonstrate that a confounding of subjective 
probability and affective valence could be avoided in the present study. Therefore, 
affective valence seems to be a predictor of causal attributions in its own right. Thus, 
the need to explain negative events is not merely a subcategory of the need to explain 
unexpected events. 
On the other hand, no evidence for an increase in causal reasoning after unexpected 
events was obtained in the present study. One possible explanation for this unexpected 
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finding is that the expectedness of the outcome was not as important to subjects as its 
affective valence in this particular situation. In different types of situations, the relative 
impact of expectancy and valence on causal reasoning may be quite variable. 
Nevertheless, the manipulation check revealed a significant difference in subjects’ 
expectations between the high and low expectancy conditions, indicating the 
effectiveness of the present manipulation. Thus, it is safe to conclude that the observed 
effects of affective valence were independent of subjective probability, despite a 
successful variation of the latter variable. 
Now that the influence of affective valence on causal reasoning has been 
demonstrated and disentangled from expectancy effects, the question arises, why 
persons in a negative mood are likely to generate more causal attributions than 
persons in a positive mood. In this regard, it is important to note parallel findings in 
other research areas that suggest pronounced influences of individuals’ affective state 
on information processing. It has been demonstrated, for example, that positive 
mood, as compared to neutral mood, elicits simplified processing strategies and less 
systematic problem solving on complex judgmental tasks (Isen et al., 1982). Similarly, 
persons in a negative mood were found to elaborate the arguments of a persuasive 
communication systematically, whereas persons in a positive mood did not engage in 
systematic processing. Accordingly, subjects in a depressed mood were more 
persuaded by strong than by weak arguments, whereas subjects in an elated mood 
were equally affected by both types of arguments in their cognitive responses as well as 
in their attitude change (Bless et al., 1988; Worth and Mackie, 1987). There are, at 
least, three possible explanations for the increase in causal and analytic reasoning 
under the influence of negative events and the resulting negative feeling states. 
First, an intensified search for causal explanations makes it more likely that 
external and self-irrelevant attributions for the event may be identified (Wyer and 
Carlston, 1979). Thereby the evaluation of the event and its consequences may change 
and the negative feelings associated with it may be reduced. Second, the increase of 
causal reasoning after a negative event may serve the purpose of preparing actions that 
are likely to eliminate the aversive state or to avoid similar events in the future. In 
order to actively eliminate or avoid certain situations, a person must have reasonably 
accurate knowledge about their causation, i.e., he or she needs to know what 
conditions are to be changed or avoided. A third explanation does not focus on the 
results of causal attributions, but on the process of causal reasoning itself. Causal 
thinking itself may reduce the intensity of affective states (e.g. Speisman et al., 1964; 
Schwarz, 1987). This hypothesis is supported by the finding that thinking about 
pleasant or unpleasant past life events leads to pronounced changes in affective states 
if it is vivid and concrete. If, on the other hand, thinking is focused on causal 
explanations for the event, changes in affect are not obtained (Strack et al., 1985, 
Experiment 3) .  Thus, causal thinking may serve for the control of emotion. 
Obviously, these process assumptions are not mutually exclusive. Which one is most 
applicable, and how far the different mechanisms may be intertwined, cannot be 
decided on the basis of the available data and awaits clarification by further research. 
The purpose of the present study was to disentangle the natural confounding of 
affective valence and subjective probability in a controlled experiment. The results 
suggest that affective valence by itself should be taken into account as a determinant of 
causal attribution in its own right. 
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RESUME 
Qu’est ce qui tlicite I’attribution causale: I’impact de la valence et des probabilitts subjectives. 
Plusieures ttudes sur le terrain et des simulations exptrimentales ont demontrk que le 
raisonnement causal augmente aprks des tvtnements inattendus aussi bien qu’aprks des 
tvtnements dtsagrtables. Cependant, des tvtnements dtsagrtables apparaissent moins 
probables dans la vie quotidienne que des tvtnements agrtables. De fait, la probabilitt d’un 
tvtnement et sa valeur htdonique Ctaient confondues de manitre naturelle dans ces ttudes. Pour 
isoler la contribution des deux facteurs, la probabilitt subjective et la valence d’un Cvtnement 
ttaient manipultes indtpendamment dans une exptrience de laboratoire. Les sujets ont rtpondu 
i un soi-disant ‘test de savoir-faire professionel’ et ttaient informts de leur rtussite ou de leur 
tchec selon un critkre ttabli par I’exptrirnentateur. La probabilitt subjective de rtussite a t t t  
manipulte en informant les sujets de la distribution des rtussites et des tchecs dans une 
population comparable (soit 23 per cent soit 77 per cent rtussissaient le test). Les rtsultats 
indiquent un effet marqut de la valence: lorsque le sujet croyait avoir tchout, I’intensitt du 
raisonnement causal Ctait plus forte et les raisons avanctes pour expliquer l’tchec plus 
nombreuses que lorsque le sujet croyait avoir rtussi, et cela indtpendamment de la probabilitt a 
priori de la rtussite. Aucun effet du characttre attendu ou inattendu de I’kvtnement sur 
l’explication causale a t t t  trouvt. Plusieurs processus mtdiateurs sont discutts. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
In einer Reihe von Feldstudien und Simulationsexperimenten wurde gezeigt, daR sowohl 
erwartungsdiskrepante als auch negative Ereignisse das AusmaR kausalen Nachdenkens 
erhohen. Da im Alltag allerdings unangenehme Ereignisse fur unwahrscheinlicher gehalten 
werden als angenehme, war somit die subjektive Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Ereignisses mit der 
durch die Valenz des Ereignisses ausgelosten Stimmung konfundiert. Um diese Konfundierung 
aufzulosen, wurden in einem Laborexperiment subjektive Erwartung und Vatenz unabhangig 
voneinander variiert. Versuchspersonen bearbeiteten einen angeblichen Berufseignungstest und 
erhielten anschliebend eine Erfolgs- oder MiRerfoIgsruckmeldung, bezogen auf ein vom 
Versuchsleiter vorgegebenes Kriterium. Die subjektive Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit wurde 
variiert, indem den Versuchspersonen die Verteilung von Erfolg und MiRerfolg in der 
Population mitgeteilt wurde (‘23 Prozent vs. 77 Prozent der Teilnehmer erreichen das 
Kriterium’). Die Ergebnisse zeigen einen ausgepragten Effekt der Valenz: Sowohl die lntensitat 
des kausalen Nachdenkens als auch die Anzahl der Ursachen fur das Ergebnis, uber die die 
Versuchspersonen nachdenken, ist nach negativer Ruckmeldung groRer als nach positiver. Die 
vorliegende Untersuchung bietet keine Evidenz fur eine Zunahme kausalen Nachdenkens nach 
unerwarteten Ereignissen. Verschiedene vermittelnde Prozesse werden diskutiert. 
